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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff and
Respondent

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF

vs.
UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,,

Case No. 880201

Defendants and
Appellants,

I.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Respondent commenced this action to obtain an Order
requiring Appellants to disclose salary information concerning
employees to Respondent.
of Respondent.

Summary Judgment was entered in favor

This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-2-2(3)(i).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following issues are presented for review on this
Appeal:
1.

Is the Appellant Utah State Bar (the "Bar") a state

agency and therefore required to disclose to Respondent Brian M.
Barnard ("Barnard") salary information concerning the Bar's
employees under the provisions of the Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act (Utah Code Ann., Sec.
63-2-59, et seq.) (hereinafter the "Records Act") and the Public
and Private Writings Act (Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-26-1, et seq.)
(hereinafter the "Writings Act")?

2.

Can either the Records Act or the Writings Act be

constitutionally applied to the Bar?
III.
A,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Proceedings in the Court Below.

Barnard commenced this action against the Bar and its
Executive Director, Stephen F. Hutchinson ("Hutchinson"),
seeking an Order requiring the Bar to disclose to him the exact
salaries and benefits received by all employees of the Bar on
the basis that the Bar is allegedly a state agency and is
therefore required to disclose this information pursuant to the
provisions of the Records Act and the Writings Act.

Barnard

also sought punitive damages and attorneys1 fees.
Shortly after the Complaint was filed, Barnard moved for
Summary Judgment.

On May 9, 1988, the Court, the Honorable

Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, granted Barnard's Motion for Summary
Judgment requiring the Bar to disclose the salary information to
Barnard, but denied Barnard's demand for punitive damages and
attorneys' fees.

Execution on the Judgment was stayed pending

appeal.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Barnard is a member of the Bar. [R. 22]

In November

1987, Barnard requested information concerning salaries and
benefits paid to Bar employees. [R. 23]

In response, the Bar

voluntarily provided him salary ranges for different categories
of Bar employees and a description of fringe benefits for the
Bar staff. [R. 24]
Not satisfied with the information provided by the Bar,
Barnard filed this lawsuit contending that the Bar is a state
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Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4.

The Supreme Court has

delegated to the Bar certain responsibilities.

However, all

decisions by the Bar and its authorized committees concerning
the admission, suspension or disbarment of members of the Bar
are advisory only to the Supreme Court, which retains the
constitutional power to admit, discipline or disbar members of
the Bar. [R. 102]
Although the Bar in all its functions is subject to the
supervision and control of the Supreme Court, the Bar engages in
numerous activities other than the admission and discipline of
attorneys which the Supreme Court has not chosen to directly
regulate or supervise such as semi-annual Bar meetings, various
educational courses and seminars, a newsletter and the Law and
Justice Center in Salt Lake City. [R. 102-103]
IV.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Bar is Not a State Agency.

The Bar is not a state agency and is therefore not
subject to the Records Act or the Writings Act.

Although the

Bar was "perpetuated, created and continued" by the Supreme
Court and is subject to strict regulation, the Bar privately
owns its property and pays taxes and is governed by its own
by-laws just like other private organizations.

Although the

Supreme Court has delegated certain administrative functions
relating to the admission and discipline of attorneys to the Bar
and with regard to those functions the Bar acts as an agent or
arm of the Court, that does not make the Bar a state agency for
all purposes.

B
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The Writings Act neither utilizes nor defines the term "state
agency".

Rather, the Writings Act refers to "public writings"

and "public officers". The bar would concede, however, that
ifthe Bar is in fact a "state agency", the Writings Act on its
face applies to the Bar.
The Utah Supreme Court has never had occasion to address
the issue of whether the Bar is somehow to be considered a state
agency.

However, an analysis of the organization and operation

of the Bar, as well as relevant judicial decisions, leads to the
conclusion that the Bar should not be considered a state agency,
but a private organization which performs certain public
functions and is regulated and supervised by the Supreme Court
as are all attorneys.
The Bar is an unincorporated, non-profit organization
which the Supreme Court "perpetuated, created and continued"
when it integrated the Bar in 1981. The Bar was initially
organized in 1931.

In many respects, the Bar functions as a

professional association.

The Bar has the authority and

capacity to sue and to be sued, to execute contracts and to hold
and dispose of property.

In this connection, the Utah Supreme

Court has made it very clear in its rules that the Bar's
property, both real and personal, is private property, owned by
the Bar, and is not owned by the state. [Rule (A)l, Rules for

That section seems to contemplate an elective not
mandatory program by the legislative and judicial
branches, therefore implying applicability only to the
executive branch.

Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar.]

Further, the

Bar pays taxes both on its real and personal property.

Private'

ownership of property and liability for taxes are both
absolutely and totally irreconcilable with any notion that the
Bar is a state agency.

Indeed, by filing this action, Barnard

implicitly recognized that the Bar is not a state agency because
he didn't even attempt to give a notice of claim which would
have been required before filing suit against a state agency.
See, U.C.A., Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12.
Although the Supreme Court regulates and supervises the
Bar by virtue of its constitutional power to govern the practice
of law, the Bar is in large part self-governed through Bar
commissioners which are elected by Bar members, and an Executive
Director who is selected by the commissioners.

Further, the Bar

was authorized by the Supreme Court to and has in fact adopted
its own bylaws. Although the Supreme Court has the power to
regulate all functions of the Bar, the Court has not chosen to
regulate or supervise many of its activities, such as
educational courses and seminars, Bar meetings, a newsletter and
the Law and Justice Center.

The Bar does not receive any public

funds, but is funded solely by dues and fees paid by its members
and Bar applicants.

The employees of the Bar are not paid by

the state, nor are they entitled to any of the benefits enjoyed
by state employees, such as membership in a state retirement
plan or insurance.
In the Trial Court, Barnard contended that because the
Bar was created by the Supreme Court and/or the Legislature and
is regulated and supervised by the Supreme Court, the Bar is a

state agency.

This conclusion simply does not follow.

For example, in Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723
P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), the Utah Technology Finance Corp. ("UTFC")
had been created by the Legislature in 1985 and funded with One
Million Dollars ($1,000,000) of public funds for the purpose of
assisting in the development of small high-tech businesses. By
statute, the State Treasurer was made the custodian of all of
the funds appropriated to the UTFC, as well as any other funds
that the UTFC acquired.

The UTFC was required to make an annual

report to the Governor and was subject to annual audit by the
State Auditor.

The UTFC was governed by trustees appointed for

three-year terms by the Governor with the consent of the
Senate.

Thus, the UTFC was created by the Legislature, was

funded with tax monies and was subject to strict regulation and
control by the state.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that

the UTFC was not a state agency, but was intended by the
Legislature to be, and in fact was, an independent, public
non-profit corporation.
The case of Matter of Washington State Bar Association,
548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976), is also instructive.

There, the

Washington State Auditor sought to audit the Washington State
Bar under a statute giving him the power to audit any state
agency or department.

The Auditor argued that the fact that the

State Bar Act of 1933 referred to the Washington Bar as "an
agency of the state" was determinative on the issue of whether
the Bar was a state agency and thus subject to audit. The
Washington Supreme Court determined that the meaning of the term
"agency" depends on its context and held that the Legislature

did not intend to subject the Bar to audits and that the Bar was
not a state agency within the meaning of the subject statute.
Barnard argued, and the District Court ruled, that the
case of Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980), is
controlling in the case at bar.

It is respectfully submitted

that Redding provides little guidence in the present case. All
the Supreme Court decided in Redding was that Weber State
College was a public institution, heavily dependent upon tax
funds for its operation, and, therefore, was required to
disclose the salaries of its employees under the Records Act.
Appellants have no quarrel with the Redding case. Obviously,
Weber State College is a public institution.

The Bar is not.

In this connection, it is important to note that the Supreme
Court justified the right of the public to access to the salary
information upon the basis that Weber State College received
public tax funds and the public had a right to know how its
taxes were being spent.

The Bar does not receive any tax monies

or any other funds from the state.
The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to govern
the practice of law in the State of Utah.

That power includes

the power to regulate and control attorneys who are officers of
the court. The authority which the Supreme Court has given to
the Bar in the areas of licensing and discipline is simply a
delegation of certain of the Supreme Court's powers.

In re

Disciplinary Action of McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986); In re
Utah State Bar Petition, Etc., 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1981).

The

Supreme Court could just as well have delegated those
responsibilities to specific attorneys or other individuals.

The fact that the Supreme Court has chosen to delegate certain
responsibilities with respect to the admission and discipline of
the members of the Bar to the Bar itself, probably means that
the Bar engages in "state action" insofar as certain
constititional issues such a due process are concerned when the
Bar performs those specifically delegated functions. However,
that does not mean that the Bar itself is somehow transformed
into a state agency for all purposes.
In this regard, "public officers" are subject to the
provisions of the Records Act.

Sec. 63-2-61 of that Act defines

"public officers" as including "officers of any court."
attorneys are officers of the courts.
of McCune, 717 P.2d at 705.

All

In re Disciplinary Action

Certainly, Barnard would not argue

that therefore all attorneys are public officers and subject to
the provisions of the Records Act.

The mere fact that attorneys

or the Bar itself may be considered officers of the Supreme
Court or as acting by its authority does not transform them into
a state agency.
In summary, the Bar is a private organization which is
largely self-governing but which is subject to the regulation
and control of the Supreme Court (just as all attorneys are) and
which has been delegated by the Supreme Court certain
responsibilities to police its own members. There is absolutely
no indication, either in the legislative history of previously
applicable statutes, or in the superceding rules adopted by the
Supreme Court, that the Bar was intended to be a state agency.
Indeed, such a holding would be absolutely irreconcilable with

the Supreme Court rule recognizing the Bar's right to privately
own property and the fact that the Bar is required to pay taxes.
B.

The Statutes Cannot be Constitutionally Applied to

the Bar.
Even if this Court were to determine that the Bar is a
state agency, neither the Records Act nor the Writings Act can
constitutionally be applied to the Bar.
In its official functions, the Bar is an arm of the
Supreme Court.

The statutes cannot constitutionally be applied

to the Bar because the Supreme Court has the sole constitutional
right to administer the judicial department and govern the
practice of law.
Art. V, Sec. 1, of the Utah Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah
shall be divided into three distinct departments,
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in
part:
The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice
of law, including admission to practice law and the
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
practice law.
The Legislature has no power or authority as to which of
the judiciary's records shall be opened to the public or the
process by which that determination is made. To allow the
Legislature to do so would be an impermissible incursion upon
the prerogatives of the Supreme Court.

For example, the Writings Act expressly includes as a
public writing "judicial records".
78-26-1(2).

Utah Code Ann., Sec.

The Writings Act then goes on to provide that,

"every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any
public writing or this state except as otherwise expressly
provided by statute."

Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-26-2.

This

statute would purport to deny the courts the right to seal case
files.

Although there is a common law right for the public to

inspect court records, that right is not absolute and it is up
to the courts to decide in a given case whether that right is
outweighed by competing interests.

See, Huntsman-Christensen

Corp. v. Entrada Industries, 639 F.Supp. 733 (D.Utah 1986).
In Pasik v. State Board of Law Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d
270 (N.Y. 1984), the plaintiff sought certain information from
the New York Bar concerning his Bar exam pursuant to the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Law.

The Court held

that plaintiff was not entitled to this information as the
judiciary was expressly exempted from the Law and that the Bar
in the discharge of its official duties was a part of the
judiciary.
In Matter of Washington State Bar Assoc, supra, the
Court held that the Washington State Bar Assoc, was not subject
to audit by the State Auditor under the Separation of Powers
Doctrine.

The Court observed:

There is yet another ground that renders
petitioner's attempted audit inappropriate. We
have earlier made clear that the regulation of the
practice of law in this state is within the
inherent power of this Court. This is the holding
of the vast majority of courts in this country that
have considered this issue. [Citations omitted]

. . • ,f[T]his Court does not share the power
of discipline, disbarrment, suspension or
reinstatement with either the Legislature or the
State Bar Association. The ultimate constitutional
power clearly lies within the sole jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court." . . . We also there established
that in spite of the language of the State Bar Act,
the association was not an "agency of government"
so as to be one of the "state executive offices"
required . . . to move their principal place of
business to the seat of government. The State Bar
Association, we recognized, is an association that
is sui generis many of whose important functions
are directly related and in aid of the judicial
branch of government.
. . . The Legislature's characterization of
the Bar as an "agency of the state" does not
deprive this Court of its right of control of the
Bar and its functions as a separate, independent
branch of government. [548 P.2d at 315-316]
Similarly, in Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609
S.W.2d 682 (KY. 1980), the Court held that the Auditor of Public
Accounts of the State of Kentucky was not entitled to audit the
books and accounts of the Kentucky Bar Association, observing:
As we have indicated, we have no doubt that
the General Assembly has the authority to require
an accounting of funds it has appropriated from
revenues it has caused to be raised. What we have
in this case, however, are funds that have not been
collected pursuant to any statute and have no been
appropriated by the legislative body and are not
subject to legislative appropriation. Both the
Association and the Board of Bar Examiners exists
solely by virtue of rules of this Court expressly
and exclusively authorized by Const. Sec. 116.
There is no constitutional authority by which they
can be made accountable to either of the other two
branches of government except for their stewardship
of such funds or property as may come into their
possession through these sources. Neither of those
agencies has any such funds or property. Their
funds and property are public funds and property
because their official functions are entirely
public in nature, but their accountability is to
this Court only, of which they are an integral
part. [jEd. at 686]

In summary, it is not for the Legislature to determine
what records the judiciary will and will not make public or to
prescribe the manner in which such a determination is made. The
Bar is an arm of the judiciary.

Consequently, neither the

Records Act nor the Writings Act can constitutionally be applied
to the Bar.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the Summary Judgment entered in favor of Barnard should be
reversed with directions to enter Judgment in favor of the Bar.
DATED this 8th day of September, 1988.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
" tTARMAN E. KIPP
BURBIDGE/^ M I T C H f e /

RICHARD V^T. BURB£#GE
Attorneys for Appellants
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